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20 Sept

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20 SEP 1962

SC No. 08172/62

MEMORANDUM FOR: INR/RSB, Mr. Morris Crawford
SUBJECT: Soviet Military Technicians Abroad

1. Soviet military technicians usually are provided to a recipient of Soviet military aid on a contract basis. Specific technical assistance contracts are drawn up as a part of an overall aid agreement. The contracts designate specialties and numbers of technicians to perform specific jobs for specific lengths of time. Usually these technicians are highly specialized -- submarine battery experts, aircraft electronics specialists, missile transportation and handling specialists, etc. -- although some "line" officers are included. There is excellent contractual information on the terms under which Soviet technical assistance currently is being provided to Iraq and Indonesia, particularly for the construction of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Much of this information has been very recently acquired, however, and cannot be fully reflected in this memorandum.

2. Most of the personnel sent by the USSR as military technicians are engaged per the contract to work on military equipment (assembly, checkout, and maintenance), rather than to provide training. Many, however, in actuality apparently operate in a dual capacity, instructing their counterparts in the recipient country as they proceed with their duties. The number of personnel sent as military technicians varies with the type of equipment involved, the amount of training provided before delivery, and, perhaps most important, the urgency of the program to bring weapons into operational status. In Iraq and Indonesia, for instance, the basic arms contracts generally call for training -- sometimes in the Bloc -- to take place prior to delivery of equipment, or for some equipment to be delivered for training purposes.

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before the main arms shipments. Such procedures usually mean that the number of Soviet personnel required is smaller than when large amounts of materiel arrive prior to training for nationals of the receiving country.

3. Just prior to the settlement of the West New Guinea dispute, some Soviet equipment was hastily delivered to Indonesia, evidently to bolster Djakarta's overall position against the Dutch during the crucial stages of negotiations. Naval vessels and aircraft were dispatched almost immediately after the Soviets and Indonesians concluded a supplementary contract in 1962 and thus obviously without prior training for Indonesian crews. The large influx of Soviet personnel into Indonesia in this period consequently involved many persons to man or operate equipment rather than technical specialists and training personnel. In the wake of the Dutch-Indonesian settlement, the status of these people is still unclear, but they probably will return to the USSR as training proceeds.

4. Aside from this significant variation, Soviet practice in providing military technical assistance has been relatively consistent. A substantial number of technicians and specialists normally accompany a delivery of equipment. Some of these stay only long enough to put the equipment into operation, while others remain for longer periods to conduct training in the use and maintenance of the equipment. Until recently, however, when the influx of equipment into Indonesia and the current shipments to Cuba made it necessary to send great numbers of Soviet personnel to handle the equipment, Soviet military aid missions abroad have been relatively small. Afghanistan has received large numbers of Soviet military personnel this year as part of an effort to reorganize the entire Afghan military establishment. In every instance, however, it appears that these military specialists are sent for a specified period of time, after which they depart.

5. Because presently available evidence suggests most of the Soviets arriving in Cuba are

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connected with the establishment of air and coastal defense systems employing guided missiles, the most pertinent information on technical assistance to other countries is that dealing with the supply of missiles. Both Indonesia and Iraq are receiving, among other things, the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system now being installed in Cuba. Iraq is to receive equipment for 5 SAM sites, one of which is a training unit, and Indonesia is receiving about 14 sites, including one training unit. Equipment for the training unit was delivered to Indonesia earlier this year and is due to arrive in Iraq later in 1962. Around 100 Soviet military specialists are being sent to each of these countries for setting up these training sites and handling the instruction. Equipment for the other sites will be delivered next year, after nearly a year's training has taken place.

6. The personnel assigned to these training units are scheduled to stay abroad for periods from one to 12 months, after which they presumably will return to the USSR. Some may be extended to help install operational SAM sites. Many more Soviets are expected to arrive when the other SAM sites are set up, but we have few indications of the total number involved or the length of their proposed stay. There is evidence, however, suggesting that the USSR intends eventually to turn the systems over to the host countries and almost all the Soviets will depart. As in any military aid program, a certain number are likely to remain behind to help maintain the equipment and oversee training operations.

7. In Cuba, however, the situation is considerably different from that in Iraq or Indonesia. The current program of Soviet military aid is proceeding on a crash basis and is apparently designed to set up effective air and coastal defense systems in the shortest possible time. Soviet military personnel -- now estimated at not less than 4,000 -- arriving in conjunction with these shipments probably will not only set up and assemble equipment, but, if necessary, will also man and operate the SAM sites while Cubans are being trained. It is likely this training will be aimed at an eventual takeover of all the equipment by Cubans, but at present there is no firm indication

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of how long this will take. Based on information from Indonesia and Iraq, as well as on Soviet experience, not less than six months and probably closer to a year will be required before the equipment could be operated largely by Cubans. The period will depend on the urgency of the training program and the degree of Cuban proficiency desired. In view of the USSR's commitments to Cuba, large numbers of Soviet personnel probably will stay in Cuba for some time to ensure the effectiveness of the weapons supplied. Based on Soviet actions elsewhere, however, it is likely that most of them eventually will depart, leaving the equipment in Cuban hands.

8. We have no information on the number of Soviets accompanying the recent deliveries of MIG-21s to Cuba. [REDACTED] It appears that this program would involve only several hundred personnel at most. Some of these -- probably numbering on the order of a hundred -- are likely to stay in Cuba for a month or two but will leave after assembly and checkout work is completed. Others, however, probably will stay for a year or more to provide training in maintenance and flight instruction on the new aircraft, and on the ground control equipment associated with the MIG-21. Such training is still being conducted by Soviet pilots and instructors on the older models of MIG fighters provided to Cuba more than a year ago.

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9. The number of Soviets necessary for the eight Komar-class guided missile boats also is unknown. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] men probably will be kept on hand for several months while training is conducted, both in the handling of the boats and in the use of the missiles.

AC for
OTTO E. GUTH
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

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